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From punishment to prevention: 
A French case study of the introduction of co-regulation 
in enforcing food safety 
 
Elodie Rouvière1 & Julie A. Caswell2 
 
Abstract 
In the last decade, the concept of co-regulation has been developed and increasingly promoted 
as an important instrument of regulation. In the context of food safety, we examine co-
regulation programs from the point of view of an enforcement agency. We develop a 
conceptual framework of enforcement of food safety regulation for use in assessing the 
degree of shift toward co-regulation from traditional approaches and apply it to a case study 
of the French import market for produce at Perpignan. We find that co-regulation in the 
enforcement of pesticide residue limits resulted in a change of practices for the regulatory 
agency from punishment to prevention based on incentives and information programs. 
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From an economic perspective, the existence of market failures is the central rationale 
for regulatory intervention in the provision of food safety. The market failure is due to the 
existence of asymmetric information about food safety attributes between producers and 
consumers or imperfect, symmetric information for both consumers and producers (Antle, 
1996). In most developed countries, food safety regulation has focused on the imposition of 
standards that specify how food products should be produced and/or their final safety level. 
However, since the 1990s food safety regulations have evolved worldwide and food 
operators have frequently been given more responsibility to monitor the safety of their 
products (Henson and Caswell, 1999; Loader and Hobbs, 1999; Segerson, 1999; Henson and 
Hooker, 2001; Codron et al, 2007). New governance structures have emerged that employ 
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greater coordination between public agents and food firms. By governance structures, we 
mean coordination schemes (novel regulatory tools) between private and public agents that 
are intended to facilitate the compliance of food operators with food safety regulation. These 
new governance structures may be analyzed as co-regulation programs for food safety 
(Garcia-Martinez et al., 2007).  
There is a growing literature on co-regulation but relatively little discussion has been 
focused on potential complementarities in the operations of regulatory agencies. In the 
context of the United States, Coglianese and Lazer (2003) develop a framework to analyze the 
conditions under which “management based regulation” will likely prove effective and 
explore the choices regulators confront in designing these systems. Fairman and Yapp (2005) 
focus on “enforced self regulation” in the United Kingdom, particularly for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, investigating the impact of enforcement mechanisms on the 
compliance process. They show that the means of enforcement are the main drivers of 
compliance. Using Eijlander’s (2005) definition of co-regulation, Garcia-Martinez et al. 
(2007) review all modes of co-regulation that appear in food safety regulatory processes from 
the standard design stage (design and implementation) to the enforcement regime (monitoring 
and enforcement). In their framework, enforced self-regulation systems will appear as 
schemes of co-regulation because in them public authorities always coordinate at a more 
intensive level with firms. They illustrate their analysis with case studies from North America 
and Europe. Garcia-Martinez et al. draw two principal conclusions: 1) the emergence of co-
regulation depends on the institutional environment and 2) co-regulation appears to play a 
greater role in enforcement regimes than in the design of regulatory processes. 
None of these studies provide a comprehensive and general approach to analyze co-
regulation programs from an enforcement agency perspective across institutional 
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environments. Here we examine the use of new co-regulation schemes focusing on a specific 
type of co-regulation where regulations are set and designed by public authorities and then 
enforced by the coordinated actions of public authorities and food operators or “enforced self-
regulation”. We look at this type of co-regulation primarily from the point of view of 
regulatory agencies. The first section of the paper provides a broader context for the definition 
of co-regulation and discusses rationales for its emergence as a means of giving more 
responsibility to food operators. The following section presents a conceptual model of 
enforcement of food safety regulations adapted from May and Burby (1998) that highlights 
the shifts in philosophy and approach that co-regulation may require of regulatory agencies. 
Based on a case study of experience in France, we find in the following section that the 
introduction of a co-regulation enforcement regime did induce changes in the enforcement 
practices of the regulatory agency. In turn, these changes in practices result in a shift from 
economic incentives based on punishment to incentives based on prevention. The last section 
provides concluding remarks and policy implications regarding modes of co-regulation for 
food safety.  
1. Why is co-regulation emerging? 
The concept of co-regulation was developed over the last two decades and is applied 
to a range of economic activities.  The development mostly focuses on potential 
complementarities between public and private activities, and potential gains from 
coordination of these activities, in circumstances where there may be market failure (public 
goods, information asymmetries, etc.). Researchers have explored these potential 
complementarities and gains from coordination in many different institutional environments 
and areas of regulation including environmental protection (Gunningham and Grabosky, 
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1998), e-commerce (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006), media (Dordeck-Jung et al., 2010), and food 
safety (Garcia Martinez et al, 2007). 
The introduction of these new regulatory tools has also launched a wide discussion 
among scholars. For instance, Black (2001) provides a core debate on the emergence of this 
new type of regulation arguing that it has changed the whole understanding of regulation per 
se. She discusses self regulation as a solution to the limits of command and control and 
highlights the importance of managing this novel regulatory tool as it becomes more broadly 
used. 
However, the definition of co-regulation often lacks clarity and varies among scholars, 
regulatory agencies, and institutions. Eijlander (2005) defines co-regulation as an approach in 
which a mixture of instruments is brought to bear on a specific problem. Co-regulation 
therefore emphasizes coordination between public and private agents in the regulatory process 
(Eijlander, 2005). This coordination in the field of regulation may result in various forms of 
governance, such as agreements, conventions, and even regular laws. For Gunningham and 
Rees (1997), regulation can be perceived as consisting of a continuum ranging from detailed 
command and control regulation to pure self-regulation (no intervention) that can involve co-
regulation. Sinclair (1997) also suggests there is a rich range of policy options somewhere 
along the spectrum between these ends. According to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2002), the regulatory role is shared between 
government and industry under co-regulation. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) define co-
regulation as industry self-regulation that government oversees and/or ratifies. As noted 
above, Coglianese and Lazer (2003) and Fairman and Yapp (2005) respectively refer to 
“management-based regulation” or “enforced self-regulation”.  
  
5 
 
The food safety literature has widely addressed the issue of complementarities 
between food operators and public regulation in better providing and monitoring food safety. 
These complementarities increasingly have been promoted through changes in food safety 
regulations giving food operators more responsibility for food safety. Scholars have focused 
on the private incentive aspects of complying with food safety regulation. Food operators 
balance the costs and benefits of implementing procedures to comply with food safety 
regulations, choosing from a continuum that ranges from full compliance to non-compliance 
(Henson and Heasman, 1998). They also assess their costs and benefits relative to internal 
(resources) and external (reputation, penalties) incentives. They adopt safety measures 
according to their budget constraints, their strategies, and the structure of the market (Loader 
and Hobbs, 1999).  
As noted, there is a consensus that co-regulation lies somewhere in the middle 
between command and control intervention and no intervention (see, e.g., Garcia-Martinez et 
al., 2007, Sinclair, 1997 and Black, 2001). Command and control intervention results in 
regulatory requirements for firms that are administered and enforced by public authorities. No 
intervention refers to situations where there are no specific regulatory requirements for firms. 
In such a case, pure self-regulation may emerge. In these schemes, rules are set, administered, 
and enforced by firms on themselves (Nunez, 2007). It is often implemented through private 
incentives to industry (Bartle and Vass, 2005). Some scholars who deal with food safety and 
quality consider pure self-regulation schemes in food safety or quality as private standards 
(e.g. Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Fulponi, 2006). However, 
the distinction between self-regulation and co-regulation lacks clarity. According to Bartle 
and Vass (2005), the main criterion of co-regulation is the cooperation between public 
authorities and firms in the regulatory process. Sinclair (1997) proposes regulatory variables 
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that can be used to better match regulatory options with particular regulatory issues. For 
instance, Gunningham and Sinclair (2005) consider different policy options to provide the 
ideal regulatory outcome for agricultural non-source pollution. 
Co-regulation may arise in the process of creating new legislation or regulatory rules 
by incorporating the opinions of companies, consumers, voters, non-governmental 
organizations, and other stakeholders. The purpose of enforcement in food safety regulation is 
to monitor and enforce compliance from companies; it is the responsibility of regulatory 
agencies. According to Bartle and Vass (2005), co-regulation in enforcement involves all 
modes of regulation in which regulations are designed and set by public authorities and 
enforced by the coordinated actions of public authorities and regulated firms. An example is a 
voluntary agreement that takes the form of a common set of good practices supported by the 
government that promotes company compliance with regulatory requirements. According to 
this definition, “enforced self-regulation” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Coglianese and 
Lazer, 2003; Fairman and Yapp, 2005) appears similar to this concept of co-regulation. 
Henson and Caswell (1999) distinguish between three types of standards according to 
the level of flexibility they offer to food operators. Imposing a general target standard puts 
fewer constrains on the behaviour of food operators. Public authorities do not define a 
specific safety level for the product or the process. The pressure from public authorities 
comes from liability the firm may experience when there is a product defect that causes 
damages to consumer health. With performance standards (e.g., pathogen counts for products 
at some stage of the supply chain), public authorities require food operators to achieve 
prescribed product quality standards but the means to reach the standard are not specified by 
the authorities. Specification standards are the most stringent. Under them public authorities 
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define how food operators must produce the product. Food operators who fail to reach the 
standards commit offenses that usually result in sanctions.  
The emergence of co-regulation in enforcement generally corresponds to a shift from 
specification to performance standards and may involve an increased or reduced reliance on 
target standards (liability). Lee and Marsden (2009) describe the roots of the co-regulation 
dynamic in food safety regulation in the United Kingdom. They argue that the Food Safety 
Act in 1990, which placed more responsibility of private parties, was the first step in the 
development of co-regulation in food supply chains where private interests and contracting in 
global markets take a prominent place. As a consequence, private regulation of food quality 
and food safety has been stimulated through the emergence of private standards owned by 
retailers. These and subsequent developments have modified the whole organisation and 
governance of the supply chain in providing and monitoring food safety (Fulponi, 2006). 
In the United States, prior to 1996 most food regulation required food operators to 
implement specification standards. This began to change with the adoption of mandatory 
Pathogen Reduction-Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (PR-HACCP) for the meat and 
poultry industries (Loader and Hobbs, 1999). In connection with the new regulation, the Food 
Safety and Inspection Service developed a series of guidebooks on how to implement PR-
HACCP to assist firms in complying. HACCP was then implemented by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration for the seafood industry in 1999 and for some juices in 2001. Similar 
developments have occurred in Europe. In 2001, European Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, 
also called the “Food Law,” was issued. It is characterised by the increased involvement and 
responsibility of private actors with regard to food safety controls. For example, since 2001 
importers of fresh produce have been responsible for safety controls within their firms and 
therefore must implement a system of self-monitoring aimed at checking whether imported 
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products satisfy the Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for pesticides defined by European 
law (Rouvière et al., 2010). 
The emergence of co-regulation as a novel regulatory tool to enhance compliance 
from food operators in enforcement of food safety regulations is widely acknowledged. For 
example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Food Protection Plan (2007) calls for 
promotion of increased corporate responsibility to prevent foodborne illness. From a policy 
perspective, it is important to understand the forms that co-regulation is taking in enforcement 
and to analyze its impacts. 
2. A framework for analyzing co-regulation in regulatory enforcement 
regimes 
The literature on enforcement has widely addressed enforcement regimes taking regulatory 
agencies as the unit of analysis. As noted above, co-regulation can take many forms when 
incorporated into enforcement regimes. Co-regulation can be all the possible combinations 
between public and private mechanisms leading to a novel regulatory tool which can be 
implemented to help food operators to become compliant with regulations. For instance, as 
suggested by Fairman and Yapp (2005), free education and advice approaches might be used 
by regulatory agencies to increase compliance. We hypothesize that adoption of a co-
regulation approach leads to systematic changes in enforcement regimes.  
Regulation may be ex-ante in the form of regulatory standards and enforcement or ex 
post in the form of liability. We focus on ex-ante regulation. Figure 1 presents an analytical 
framework for mapping and assessing changes in ex-ante enforcement regimes adapted from 
May and Burby (1998). May and Burby (1998) divide the enforcement regime for ex ante 
regulation into three parts. 
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· Enforcement philosophy: the role an agency plays in inducing companies to 
comply with regulatory requirements. May and Burby (1998) distinguish 
between reactive and proactive approaches. The two differ in their purpose and 
how public authorities react when they detect that a regulatory offence has 
occurred. A reactive approach seeks to identify food operators that do not 
comply with regulations and penalize them with sanctions. A proactive 
approach seeks to implement measures that are necessary to avoid a breach of 
the regulation, including, for example, education and coaching. It is a 
preventive approach to inducing compliance from firms. 
· Enforcement strategy: how the agency combines its practices in order to induce 
company compliance. Enforcement strategies are classified into two broad 
categories. Strict enforcement relies on strict application of rules, with 
inspections carried out in order to punish major regulatory offences. Creative 
strategies promote compliance through, for example, the use of market 
incentives or relaxed inspections. 
· Enforcement practices: the different sets of practices available to regulatory 
agencies to enforce regulations. These are discussed in detail below. 
As shown in Figure 1, the framework puts analysis of enforcement practices at the 
center. Again following May and Burby, we use analysis of the observed enforcement 
practices implemented by a regulatory agency to draw conclusions about the underlying 
enforcement philosophy and strategy. The major classes of enforcement practices analyzed 
are inspections, information, and sanctions. 
Inspections: There are two types of inspections that a public agency can implement 
for enforcement of food safety regulations. First, official inspections can be performed by 
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regulatory agencies through formal and random or scheduled on-site visits. The focus of these 
inspections may be product or process-oriented. Product-oriented inspections focus on the 
safety level of the product (e.g., pathogen counts for products at different stages of the supply 
chain, the level of pesticide residues in produce) and occur before or after the release of the 
product on the market. Process-oriented inspections focus on the procedures that food 
operators have implemented to prevent food safety failure. Inspections are intended to deter 
food operators from failing to perform the appropriate procedures.  
Second, official inspections may be carried out through self-reporting or registration. 
Self-reporting allows for second level inspections where regulatory agencies evaluate a firm’s 
compliance by monitoring its records. Based on individual records, enforcement agencies can 
assess a firm’s internal rules (testing, corrective procedures, and actions taken) and check 
whether firms have implemented their quality/safety management system correctly. Under 
registration, regulatory agencies implement third level inspections where they assess food 
operators’ compliance through formal verifications made by third party accreditors. 
Enforcement agencies may support such third party accreditation bodies by issuing quality 
labels or signals for firms that have achieved a certain standard (e.g., organic production).  
Information: The source of a firm’s non-compliance often is a lack of knowledge and 
understanding of regulation principles and compliance processes (Fearne et al., 2005). 
Reliable information and education/training programs may be a good means to achieve high 
rates of compliance (Fearne et al., 2004) by promoting the potential gains in business 
performance from compliance (Fearne et al., 2005). Technical support programs are designed 
to help food operators find and implement effective ways to achieve the required food safety 
level at least cost. Information programs take multiple forms that may be used separately or in 
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combination: diffusion of up-dated regulations, coaching and training programs, and 
education programs.  
Regulatory agencies can also use information disclosure to consumers or others along 
the supply chain as a market mechanism to encourage the adoption of compliant practices by 
food operators. For example, awards and labels can be used as positive market signals. These 
market signals are also useful in reducing information asymmetry between parties and 
facilitating customer decision-making when faced with the credence attributes of food 
products. Depending on consumer awareness, market mechanisms based on information could 
provide significant incentives to food operators that wish to preserve or build their market 
shares and reputation. 
Sanctions: We distinguish between three types of sanctions. All are generally used in 
connection with inspection practices. 
Repressive sanctions: Regulatory agencies can use penalties, prosecution, and recalls 
to punish intransigent food operators for committing an offence or repeatedly breaching 
regulations. Sanctions for non-compliance may include the closure of facilities, seizure of 
products, and disqualification from the market. 
Informative sanctions: Following a breach in regulations, enforcement agencies may 
mandate certain corrective actions in order to motivate food operators to comply. There may 
be a hierarchical spectrum of sanctions depending on the severity of the regulatory offence. 
Less severe violations may result in advice, notices, and warnings being given to encourage 
non-compliant firms to reach compliance through corrective actions. These corrective actions 
can be imposed by the authorities and/or left to the discretion of food operators.  
Sanctions through negative information provided to consumers: Regulatory agencies 
can display the results of official inspections and findings in order to disclose information 
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about food operators to their customers. These are often referred to as “naming and shaming” 
programs. The names of non-diligent companies are posted on the Internet, in newspapers, or 
at places of business. Another example is obliging food operators to display inspection results 
to keep customers informed. This is the purpose of the “scores on doors programs” that the 
United Kingdom Food Safety Agency has been implementing for food service establishments 
since 2006.  
As noted above, the combination of enforcement practices implemented by a 
regulatory agency can be used to analyze both the enforcement philosophy and strategy. As 
shown in Figure 1, we characterize a traditional enforcement scheme as one that uses 
inspections and repressive or negative information sanctions as the predominant enforcement 
practices. This is indicative of a reactive enforcement philosophy and a strict enforcement 
strategy. We characterize a co-regulation scheme as one that uses information approaches and 
informative sanctions predominantly. This indicates a proactive enforcement philosophy and 
a creative enforcement strategy. From a policy perspective, the degree of shift in an 
enforcement regime towards co-regulation can be evaluated by comparing the suite of 
enforcement practices used before and after the change. This evaluation using the framework 
presented in Figure 1 allows an understanding of the actual design versus the rhetorical 
representation of enforcement regimes and serves as a foundation for assessing the impacts of 
enforcement changes. 
3. From punishment to prevention in enforcement: A case study of the 
French import market for fresh produce 
 
We apply the framework through a case study of changes in the enforcement regime in 
the French import industry for fresh produce that were adopted beginning in 2001. Our 
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purpose is to map and assess changes in the enforcement regime after implementation of this 
co-regulation scheme. These changes have been characterized as a shift from a traditional to a 
co-regulation approach. From our perspective, the degree of this shift can be evaluated 
through an analysis of changes in enforcement practices that indicate the actual shift in 
enforcement strategy and philosophy. The case study is of one of the three main French 
import markets for fresh produce located in Perpignan in the south of France3. It explores how 
co-regulation has emerged in enforcement in this import market following the issuance of 
European Regulation (EC) No 178/2002. This regulation imposed greater responsibility on 
food operators for monitoring and providing food safety. 
We use data and information from two surveys conducted in 2006. The first survey is 
qualitative and was conducted with public authorities in charge of food safety controls. The 
second survey was of importers operating in the Perpignan market. Of the 98 importers 
surveyed, 66 firms participated in the co-regulation program we analyze. Respondents were 
asked questions during a face-to-face, one hour interview about the firm’s situation in 2005 
such as total sales, main product imported, and number of pesticide analyses conducted, as 
well as about their procurement practices, suppliers, and customers. For firms participating in 
the co-regulation program our questionnaire also included some qualitative questions about 
the firm's perception of changes with it. 
3.1 The co-regulation program in the French import industry for fresh produce 
The major parties in the French import industry are the importers, the Board of 
Importers, and the public authorities. In 2001, importers from the Perpignan import market 
                                               
3  There are three import markets in France: Perpignan, Rungis, and Marseille. In 2004, France imported 2.7 
million tons of produce. The Perpignan market accounts for 50.8% of this volume, followed by Rungis (34.4%) 
and Marseille (14.8%). The market in Marseille does not have a co-regulation enforcement program in effect. 
There is a program in the Rungis market but it is not linked to the one in Perpignan. 
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negotiated with public authorities to introduce a voluntary safety program carrying out 
laboratory analyses to monitor the amounts of pesticide residues in fresh produce imported 
into the European Union. This program proposed by the importers was then negotiated with 
and approved by the General Service for Consumption, Competition, and the Repression of 
Fraud (DGCCRF), one of the public authorities in charge of enforcing the law and monitoring 
food safety in France. The role of the DGCCRF in the program is to evaluate whether the 
safety process proposed by the firms is effective. Negotiations have been mostly around 
defining the safety effort that importers would provide and also on the magnitude of the 
oversight provided by DGCCRF, which is its main function in the program. While the co-
regulation program was initiated by private agents, the DGCCRF has benefited from its 
existence through being able to reallocate scarce public resources for monitoring food safety 
to industries where this kind of scheme does not exist. Moreover, public authorities argue that 
this private initiative increases the number of controls conducted on imported products, 
creating more legitimacy for importers in comparison to French producers.  
This voluntary safety program fits the definition of co-regulation in enforcement 
developed in the above sections. Both public and private agents (importers) claim that the first 
motivation in implementing this program was to achieve better levels of safety for fresh 
produce entering the French and European market (Codron et al., 2007). 
In France and Europe, the safety evaluation for the fresh fruit and vegetables sector 
relies on Maximum Residue Limits for pesticides (MRLs) set by the European authorities 
(Regulation (EC) No 396/2005) or French regulation (Decree 04/08/1992, as amended). 
According to these laws, residues found in or on produce are judged as being above, at, or 
below the limit. Thus the safety of fresh produce in France is one-dimensional, as opposed to 
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the United States, for example, where regulation of the safety of fresh produce also refers to 
the presence of microbiological hazards such as E. coli and Salmonella. 
For the importer, the primary way to monitor the safety of fresh produce is to carry out 
multi-residue laboratory analyses. A single multi-residue analysis costs about €3004 and there 
are no economies of scale in performing analyses. Under the regulatory system, French 
importers must comply with a pesticide residue performance standard; they must achieve the 
prescribed product quality standards and/or safety level. The means to achieve the safety 
standard are left to their discretion (Henson and Caswell, 1999). Under French law, the party 
or parties in control of pesticide use during the production and post-harvest periods are 
considered to be producers. Importers are thus producers and face a strict liability rule if they 
do not comply with the performance standard. 
The co-regulation program, called the “Démarche Qualité”, agreed upon by the 
government and importers in the Perpignan market is comprised of two contract agreements. 
The first is between the importers and the Board of Importers, while a second links the Board 
to public authorities. The importers are thus not committed to the public authorities directly 
but instead are responsible to their Board. The Board is in turn responsible to the public 
authorities. 
For importers, the co-regulation program is a code of conduct for controlling the safety 
level of supplies. It defines procedures that are based on the principles of the Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) method. The costs involved in joining the program are 
twofold. First, importers must pay an annual subscription fee of €1,000. Second, they must 
allocate human and financial resources to monitoring. Importers who join the co-regulation 
                                               
4  Importers who are part of the program benefit from a discount for analysis, with the cost reduced to €160. 
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program must arrange an individual laboratory analysis for each €1 million of sales. They also 
must assign an employee to manage quality control. 
3.2 Operation of the co-regulation program in the Perpignan market 
During the summer of 2006, we conducted a survey of firms that participate in the 
Perpignan produce import market. Of the 98 firms that were operating in this market, 66 
(67%) were members of the co-regulation program, while 32 (33%) were not (see Table 1). 
Most of participating firms (61.5%) joined the program when it was introduced in 2001. In 
2008, the number of participating firms was the same as in 2005, indicating a stable 
agreement. Table 1 shows that all of the importers participating in the co-regulation program 
responded to the survey, while just over one-third (12 of 32) of the non-participating 
importers responded. 
The average turnover5 of the participating firms in 2005 was €16.6 million, with a 
standard deviation of about 100%. About 50% of the firms are small and medium firms with 
less than €10 million in sales in 2005; compliance may be an issue for these firms. Fearne et 
al. (2005) establish that co-regulation schemes can be particularly important in helping small 
and medium sized firms to comply with emerging regulations. The two main products 
imported by participating firms are tomatoes (for 19.4% of firms) and citrus (e.g., oranges, 
limes) fruits (for 19.4% of firms). The leading countries of origin for the main products 
imported in France are Spain (64.5% of volume on average) and Morocco (18%). Citrus fruits 
                                               
5 Because of missing values, all descriptive statistics are given for a stable sample composed of 62 firms.  
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and tomatoes have been on specific watch plans set by the DGCCRF and the European Union 
that include the 10 riskiest fruits and vegetables with regard to pesticide residues.6 
Participation in the co-regulation program requires multi-residue testing and the 
employment of a quality manager. Most of the firms (66%) who participated in the program 
did not employ a full-time quality manager. One of the employees (most often the forklift 
operator) is assigned to this function. At the beginning of every year, the quality manager sets 
out a sampling plan for products that are more likely to show excess pesticide residues based 
on the types of produce being imported. Table 2 shows that 19.4% of program participants 
based their sampling plans on the products that public authorities had defined as risky (see 
footnote 4), 58.1% on the highest volume products, and 22.5% on all products. Our survey 
suggests that importers who are not part of the co-regulation program do not conduct 
laboratory analyses. None of the 12 firms that participated in the survey but did not participate 
in the program conducted laboratory analyses. 
Importers in the program conducted an average 24.5 analyses a year in 2004 and 26.8 
in 2005. In 2005, 75% of the firms conducted less than 30 analyses. In comparison, only 50% 
of the participating importers said that they had ordered laboratory analyses to detect levels of 
pesticide residues before implementation of the program. Their recall of their behavior is 
consistent with the perception of it expressed in interviews by the public authorities in charge 
of control. In addition to more residue testing by firms in the co-regulation program, the firms 
also had to appoint a quality manager and implement a sampling plan. Together these changes 
constitute a new routine in regard to the safety of supplies. 
                                               
6  The 10 riskiest products for pesticide residues as identified by the DGCCRF and the European Union are citrus 
fruits, celery, grapefruit, strawberries, sweet melons, sweet peppers, potatoes, lettuce, tomatoes, and peaches.  
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While the absolute number of analyses gives one indication of firms’ involvement in 
the program, the number of analyses per unit of sales (in million €) provides a measure of the 
intensity of the safety effort and compliance within the program (Rouvière et al., 2010). 
Measuring firms’ safety effort as the ratio of the number of analyses per €1 million in sales 
allows us to control for the effect of size on the absolute number of analyses. For example, 
consider that Firm A is twice as large as Firm B and that they both conduct 10 analyses a 
year. The absolute effort is the same for both firms whereas the intensity of effort by Firm B 
is twice as high as for Firm A. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the safety effort by firm size 
in the sample of participating firms. It shows that effort is decreasing with firm size. 
Moreover some firms (15 out of 62) did not comply with the program’s requirement of one 
analysis per €1 million of sales (i.e., safety effort is less than 1). This suggests that the 
minimum requirement is not strictly enforced by the Board of Importers. At the time of the 
survey, the public authorities did not consider this behavior as noncompliance by firms. In 
contrast, the other 47 firms made an effort equal to (1 firm) or above (46 firms) one analysis 
per €1 million of sales indicating that some firms had incentives to go beyond the minimum 
requirement. 
Importers are required to report to the public authorities the results of analyses that 
show levels of pesticides above the legal MRLs. Table 3 shows the number of failures 
reported by importers during 2005. There were no failures for 17 firms (27.4 %), while 23 
firms (37.1%) reported only one safety failure and 11 companies (17.7%) reported two. One 
importer (1.6%) detected 8 failures in 2005. This situation is quite rare but can occur 
particularly when products are on the top 10 riskiest products list for pesticide residues (see 
footnote 4). 
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The central position of the Board of Importers gives it the status of guarantor of the 
importers’ commitment to the program. This is an administrative organisation; the Board 
members are not involved in the import sector. They are paid by the importers and assume an 
administrative role representing them. The Board is the “spokesperson” for the importers. It 
negotiated the agreement with the public authorities on behalf of the importers.  
Under the implementation of the co-regulation program, the Board is the dedicated 
contact for the public authorities. It must ensure the controls used by the importers, for 
example that they follow their sampling plans. The Board gathers information on the number 
of analyses conducted by the firms participating in the program. However, this is not made 
publicly available to customers (retailers or wholesalers) or to the public authorities who are 
not allowed to have any information on an individual importer’s safety effort. However, when 
there is a safety failure, the Board must warn the DGCCRF about the origin of the failure (the 
name of the company) and communicate the results of the analysis. Every year, the Board 
submits a report to the French authority, the DGCCRF, which summarizes all the preventive 
actions importers have implemented during the year. The report provides information such as 
the total number of analyses done by importers, the number of pesticide analyses conducted 
on risky products (see footnote 4), and the total costs of the program. In 2008, the Board 
reported more than 1600 pesticide analyses, which was more than the about 1300 it had 
expected, with 78% of those analyses being done on risky products. The nonconformity rate 
was about 4.4%, which is comparable to the nonconformity rate for fresh produce at the 
national level during inspections conducted by the agents of the DGCCRF. In 2008, the total 
cost of the co-regulation program supported by importers was €209,805 (before taxes), which 
represents an average cost of analysis by firms of €3,278. 
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Public authorities use this annual report to support their involvement in the program. 
They can dismiss the agreement if they assess that importers and their Board do not 
satisfactorily comply with their individual commitments. In 2009, the public authorities 
legally renewed the recognition of the program, which suggests that they were satisfied with 
the outcomes. This action reinforces the considerable changes in enforcement practices, as 
discussed below, made in negotiating the agreement. 
 3.3 Changes in regulatory agency enforcement practices 
We analyze the degree of shift in the regulatory enforcement regime from traditional 
to co-regulation in the Perpignan market using the framework presented in Figure 1. The 
framework begins with an analysis of regulatory practices and then draws conclusions about 
enforcement strategy and philosophy. The regulatory agency (DGCCRF) normally performs 
official inspections in order to detect non-compliant firms. Agents mostly conduct regular on-
site, product-oriented inspections at the import point or at the retail level. In the case of fresh 
produce, samples are collected and laboratory analyses are carried out to check that residue 
levels are within the legal limits. In an official inspection, inspectors randomly select a box of 
fruit or vegetables (e.g., a box of tomatoes or apples), take one or two pieces of the produce as 
a sample of the box, and send the samples to the official laboratory, which conducts multi-
residue analyses. Once an official laboratory confirms a case of non-compliance, importers 
are found guilty of an offence. Sanctions are repressive and range from a warning letter to 
prosecution and fines. At the same time, the whole box of the incriminated produce is taken 
off the market. The 32 firms in the Perpignan market that do not belong to the voluntary 
program thus operate under a traditional enforcement regime characterized by a strict 
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enforcement strategy and reactive enforcement philosophy. They face a strict liability rule in a 
case of safety defect. 
The introduction of the co-regulation program changed the entire organization of 
official safety controls for the importers participating in the program. For these importers, 
there is a gap between the letter of the law and its enforcement. The changes affected all areas 
of enforcement practices: inspections, information, and sanctions. 
Inspections:  The survey we conducted with importers during the summer of 2006 
contained several qualitative questions. For instance, we asked participating firms how they 
would characterize changes in the regulatory agency’s enforcement practices. Of the 62 
companies in our sample, 28 (45.2%) said that the number of inspections was lower since 
they joined the program than when it was not in place. From our qualitative survey with 
public authorities we found that the routine of the regulatory agency in performing official 
inspections did change. Official inspections have become second-level controls, with 
authorities relying on the record-keeping and self-monitoring provided by the importers. Also, 
under the co-regulation program, importers self-report safety failures, with official inspectors 
assuming that importers are operating in good faith. Officials interviewed highlighted that as a 
result of the program they can reallocate resources to monitor riskier food operators. In other 
words, the reduction of inspections in the co-regulation program allows them to better 
monitor and inspect the practices of others food operators.  
When a failure is detected (at the import point or at the retail level) by the regulatory 
agency, inspectors come to assess the importers’ safety procedures. When the safety 
procedures are deemed to be correct, the importer is not held liable for the failure. For 
importers this is the most important commitment of the public authorities in the program:  
participation in the program allows importers to be found liable (under a strict liability rule) if 
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and only if they have failed to take due care (defined as conducting no analyses). In the event 
of a safety failure (at the import or retail point), an importer will be considered as having 
acted in good faith and the public authorities will apply a negligence based rule rather than the 
strict liability rule that is applied to nonmembers. 
Information: Importers are expected to know and comply with the law; ignorance of 
the law is no excuse. In the co-regulation program, importers benefit from an information 
scheme providing regular updates on regulations furnished by the regulatory agency. The 
objective is to keep importers informed concerning regulations in their industry, both at the 
European and French level. Regulatory information is centralized by the Board of Importers 
and is then diffused free of charge to participating importers. Moreover, meetings are 
organized by the Board to discuss the introduction of major developments in regulation that 
have a significant impact on how business is conducted. For instance, the introduction of the 
European Food Law (Regulation EEC 178/2002) and mandatory traceability was fully 
discussed in terms of the consequences for importers. Nonmembers have to keep informed of 
evolving regulations by their own means. 
In addition to regular regulation updates, the agreement provides a mandatory training 
program for the firms’ quality managers. It is organized each year by the regulatory agency. 
People in charge of quality must take classes on quality, methods, and risk management in 
order to implement the agreement’s procedures in the most appropriate way. In 2008, 103 
people took this training program indicating that on average more than one person is assigned 
to quality functions in participating firms. Moreover, as an information practice the regulatory 
agency promotes the agreement by allowing participating firms to use a special logo on their 
bills of sales. The logo allows firms to differentiate themselves from their rivals and indicates 
the official support of the authorities for the agreement. Importers can thereby signal that their 
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produce is safer or more closely checked and indicate their commitment to safety to their 
customers. However, this logo remains a business-to-business signal and cannot be used as a 
consumer label.7 In 2005, most of the interviewees said that at that time the program was 
difficult to promote with customers and they were not getting any price premium for selling 
more closely monitored products.  
Sanctions: The negligence liability provided by the co-regulation program resulted in 
sanctions and prosecutions for failures being very rare for participating firms. As reported by 
them, none of 66 participating firms has been prosecuted following an action by the DGCCRF 
for safety defects since their involvement in the program. The Board validated this claim that 
the global number of prosecutions has been drastically reduced to zero since 2001.  
 3.4 From punishment to prevention: Changes in enforcement strategy and philosophy 
Our case study of the adoption of the “Démarche Qualité” program for imported 
produce in the Perpignan market indicates that there was a systematic shift in enforcement 
practices for participating firms to a co-regulation approach as characterized in Figure 1. Non-
participating firms remained under the traditional strict enforcement regime.  The new 
approach is characterized by a creative enforcement strategy and a proactive enforcement 
philosophy that is more oriented toward compliance. For participating companies, the 
enforcement of safety regulation now focuses more on prevention rather than on punishment 
and deterrence. The enforcement approach is preventive because it intervenes prior to the 
occurrence of safety offences (through training and education programs) and provides 
                                               
7  Under French law, the safety attributes of fruit and vegetables are difficult to promote to consumers. Firms 
must be able prove their claims concerning the attributes of a product. In the event of false or unfounded claims, 
they are liable under crime law (Codron et al., 2007).  
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incentives (the use of a logo, relaxed inspections) to firms that participate in the program. The 
role of the regulatory agency has shifted toward co-regulation by providing assistance, 
incentives, and support to food operators for respecting regulations. 
In the case studied, the implementation of a more proactive approach in the 
enforcement of food safety regulations appears to be sustainable for two reasons. On the one 
hand, the regulatory agency designed and implemented effective incentives. For example, the 
use of market mechanisms (such as a logo or label) works as a positive incentive to participate 
in the program. Buyer-oriented information disclosure indirectly induces food operator 
compliance with the regulatory requirements. On the other hand, agencies provide technical 
support, education, and training programs to help firms become compliant. The combination 
of incentives and prevention constitutes a proactive approach. 
The new method of enforcing food safety regulation implies the use of new routines 
by official inspectors to suit the proactive approach. They must become familiar with and use 
new tools of monitoring (self-reporting). They must also provide technical assistance and 
supervise education and training programs. The capacity of official inspectors to adapt is an 
important feature of the introduction of co-regulation in the enforcement regime. The shift 
from punishment to prevention and facilitation requires a fundamental change in culture on 
the part of enforcement officials. As Yapp and Fairman (2006) point out, they must learn to 
act as educators rather than policemen. 
In this case study, we observe that the whole organization of safety controls in the 
Perpignan import market has been modified for public and private agents that are part of the 
co-regulation program. Co-regulation has modified their behavior through more coordinated 
actions to reach a common goal of better checking produce entering the French and thus the 
European market. With available data we are unable to assess if the introduction of co-
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regulation has improved the level of safety of imported produce in France. However, we can 
make a first step in assessing the impacts of enforcement changes.  
Under co-regulation, public agents have become and have to act as educators helping 
firms to comply with the regulation and providing training. There is less focus on sanctions 
and more on understanding why firms do not comply with safety standards. The companies 
have in turn introduced a really new process into their operating environment. Monitoring 
safety on a regular basis has become a central focus, although levels of safety effort vary 
considerably. The firms are now aware of the importance on their involvement in doing 
analyses and of their role as gatekeepers with regard to food safety.  
These changes resulted in a modification of the relationships between inspectors and 
importers that is more balanced. Public and private parties share the same goal of improving 
the safety of imported produce whereas their individual objectives might differ. The 
relationship has moved toward a partnership in monitoring the safety of produce. Importers 
have changed their image of the agency looking more to win-win engagement with it. Both 
agents contribute to the provision of food safety, which rather than being a sole public policy 
issue also depends on the management of the private supply chain.  
The next step in evaluating co-regulation is to assess its effect on safety. For instance, 
one means of doing so is to evaluate the evolution since the introduction of the program of the 
rate of compliance by participating and non participating firms. Another means is to track the 
safety effort of firms and asses the quality management systems they have implemented. Both 
approaches would require detailed data at the firm level. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
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We contribute to the current debate on the use of co-regulation in the enforcement of 
food safety regulations. This co-regulation mainly refers to a shift in regulatory practices in 
the areas of inspections, information, and sanctions. Co-regulation has increasingly been 
promoted as a means of transferring more responsibility to food operators. We provide a 
framework for assessing the degree of movement in regulatory practices, strategy, and 
philosophy toward co-regulation. We apply this model to assess the degree of movement 
toward co-regulation with the adoption of the “Démarche Qualité” program for imported 
produce in the Perpignan market in France. We conclude that in this case enforcement 
practices moved from a punishment to a prevention mode by providing incentives and 
information. Further research is needed to evaluate how the modifications under the co-
regulation program affected the level of food safety in the market.  
From a policy perspective, the promise of co-regulation approaches is that they may 
be more effective than traditional alternatives in reaching compliance goals and desired levels 
of food safety. In order to do so, co-regulation programs must provide the correct incentives 
and enough support to reach these goals. Further research should consider the design of 
programs in terms of incentives for food operators and designs for monitoring by public 
authorities. Moreover, research must be undertaken to assess the performance of co-regulation 
schemes in terms of rates and levels of compliance, actual delivered food safety, and cost-
effectiveness compared to traditional regulatory approaches. 
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Figure 1: A Framework for Analyzing Co-regulation in Enforcement Regimes (adapted 
by the authors from May and Burby (1998)). 
ENFORCEMENT REGIME                                    
PHILOSOPHY
ENFORCEMENT REGIME                                    
PHILOSOPHY
Inspections
Practices
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Sanctions
STRICT CREATIVESTRATEGY 
REACTIVE PROACTIVE
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Figure 2. Distribution of Participants’ Safety Effort by Size of Firm under the Co-
regulation Program 
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Table 1. Participation of Produce Importing Firms Surveyed in the Perpignan, France 
  Market in Co-Regulation Program, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All Firms Surveyed Firms 
 # 
 
% # % of Group 
Participating Importers 
 
66 
 
 
67.4% 66 100.0% 
Non Participating Importers 32 
 
32.6% 
 
12 37.5% 
Total 
 
98 
 
 
100% 78 79.6% 
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Table 2. Orientation of Importers’ Sampling Plans for Co-Regulation Participants 
 
 
 
 
Orientation of Sampling Program # of Firms % of Firms 
Risky Products 12 19.4% 
Products with Highest Volume  36 58.1% 
All Products 14 22.5% 
Total 62 100.0% 
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Table 3. Number of Safety Failures Reported by Participating Firms, 2005 
# of Failures # of Firms % of Firms 
0 17 27.4% 
1 23 37.1% 
2 11 17.7% 
3 7 11.3% 
4 1 1.6% 
7 2 3.2% 
8 1 1.6% 
Total 62 100% 
 
